Wednesday, March 05, 2008

Defendant's motion for attorneys fees denied in Warner v. Stubbs in Oklahoma

In Warner v. Stubbs, the Oklahoma case which the RIAA attempted to withdraw the same day that it received defendant's answer, the Court has denied the defendant's motion for her attorneys fees.

March 5, 2008, Order, Denying Defendant's Motion for Attorneys Fees*

* Document published online at Internet Law & Regulation



Keywords: digital copyright law online internet law legal download upload peer to peer p2p file sharing filesharing music movies indie independent label freeculture creative commons pop/rock artists riaa independent mp3 cd favorite songs intellectual property






7 comments:

Alter_Fritz said...

Maybe the ruling is within the wording of your statutes, but is it fair?!

I don't think so.

Now RIAA can run around bullying further and once it gets hot for them, they just say "We promiss not to bully you again" and they are off the hook!

From that point of view, a bad decision by the judge.

"Nice" flaw you have in your copyrightlaw with its fee paying provision that gives bullies with money and an army of lawyers at hand such an unfair advantage

Anonymous said...

This is INSANE. What is the court thinking? What this means is that the RIAA wins, even though though they dismissed their own suit. They've cost the Defendant how many thousands of dollars on a meritless suit, and they will now wave this decision in the face of every other judge in every other suit where they cut and run like this. Covenent not to sue -- what a farce!

XK-E

Jadeic said...

Simply outrageous ...

Anonymous said...

Does this mean that defendants in other cases can get their cases dismissed by filing a "covenant not to infringe"?

Regards,
Art

raybeckerman said...

In case you're wondering, the decision is legally erroneous. See, e.g. Rivera v. Jones.

Anonymous said...

So, the RIAA issued a "covenant not to sue" apparently with no evidence for or against their claims beyond the initial MediaSentry snooping.

Doesn't that raise the specter of estoppel for every new defendant facing a factually identical RIAA complaint?

Anonymous said...

One more question for folks, sorry!

One thing's always bothered me about the voluntary dismissals in RIAA cases.

Specifically, the RIAA already uses Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals to end the John Doe shotgun suits. Assuming Ms. Stubbs was previously sued as a Doe defendant, wouldn't that make this the second voluntary dismissal based on the same claim?

If so, shouldn't the dismissal then have "operate[d] as an adjudication on the merits" (Rule 41(a)(1)(B))? Adjudication on the merits would materially alter the relationship between plaintiffs and Ms. Stubbs, satisfying the prevailing party test in her favor, right?